A New video in the ongoing Kaufman-Pigliucci series is out, this one on the question of whether teleology, the idea that things have a “purpose” in the strong Aristotelian sense of the word, still makes sense in light of modern science and philosophy.
We begin our discussion by examining various meanings of “purpose” in science and in morality, and then by exploring Aristotle’s take on the subject. I argue that “what is it for?”, i.e., looking for functions, makes perfect sense in evolutionary biology, but not in other sciences, such as chemistry or geology. That’s because of the special role of natural selection in evolution. Accordingly, we explore the relationship between form and function and how the two reciprocally shape each other in living organisms.
We then move to ethics, exploring the idea of moral laws. From there, we discuss the different paths to human flourishing and how they relate to the concept of meaning and purpose. Finally, I explain once again what Sam Harris gets wrong about the relationship between science and ethics. But you can skip that bit if you are (understandably) tired of that particular dead horse… (or you can read my original critique here).
Here is the full video:
Footnotes to Plato 
Reblogged this on The Logical Place.
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Massimo: One thing that has changed since you wrote that article is that you are no longer a moral realist, as you say you are there, right?
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Dan,
Correct, I have abandoned moral realism since writing that review of Harris’ book. Add another one to my collection of “I can prove to you that I change my mind, from time to time…”
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Superb article! Personally I’ve always disliked Aristotle’s arguments for teleology and his explication of virtue.
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Hi Massimo,
And I was just about to lay into that review on that point! 🙂
You are entirely right in rejecting Harris’s claim that science cannot prescribe values or determine moral facts. But that is not because of any limitation of science, and not because “moral facts” are instead the property of some other enterprise, such as philosophy, it is rather — and straightforwardly — because there is no such thing as a “moral fact” and the quest for such is delusional, a simple category error.
So Sam Harris is wrong, but no more so than the majority of philosophers who are still moral realists, including “names” such as Peter Singer. Indeed, to some extent I’d commend Harris for presenting his ideas sufficiently straightforwardly that the errors are easy to spot, whereas moral-realist philosophers are better at hiding their errors under layers of obfuscatory verbiage.
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Makes sense to me. Though the the chemistry of reproducing molecules is a border line case. I generally dislike the ‘intentional stance’.
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WHAT IS LIFE?
Pross, Addy. What is Life?: How Chemistry Becomes Biology (Oxford Landmark Science) (Kindle Locations 2-3). OUP Oxford. Kindle Edition.
This book (A Martin Perl Book Club selection) addresses the issue of purpose and how it arises it. I found it to be hyped up in its claims to solve the problem of life, but it has some quite interesting parts.
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Coel,
Please do not commend Harris for being obviously wrong. That’s lowering the bar for commending a bit too much.
I’m not sure the majority of philosophers are moral realists, I think it’s a plurality. And moral realism is not obviously wrong, for the same reasons mathematical Platonism isn’t either. One needs arguments.
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Synred,
You think chemical bonds, for instance, have functions? Or earthquakes? Or galaxies?
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No I don’t. I’m talking about molecules that reproduce themselves. Self-catalysis leads to exponential growth and thus evolution and from that ‘purpose’ emerges.
At least metaphorically we can say that the purpose of the molecule is to reproduce itself. However, that is a far cry from a person or a monkey that has purposes that may be bad for its reproduction.
I’m inclined to the view the self-catalysis is blind chemistry, but perhaps in the fuzzy border lands.
The book I sited previously, claims to solve this problem. I don’t think it does, but it does cover some quite interesting experiments.
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No, I don’t think we should talk of purpose even metaphorically there, it’s misleading. The only natural source of function (not really purpose) we know of is natural selection. Which didn’t produce the ability of some molecules to partially and inefficiently self-replicate, though it did probably exploit it to get the full and efficient self-replication molecules used by living organisms.
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Massimo: ‘m not sure what ‘function’ means w/o purpose.
Gravity functions to keep the earth in orbit, but I wouldn’t say that was its purpose. Just something it does that turns out to make life and evolution possible here.
The neutron is heavier than the proton. W/o this counter intuitive situation there’d be no life, but again I would not ascribe purpose to that either. The effect of neutron being heavier than proton is to allow life (as we know it) to exist, but I wouldn’t go so far as to call that its function much less purpose.
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Synred,
That’s the difference between teleonomy and teleology. Function makes sense as a result of natural selection, but there is no purpose in the sense of someone designing things. Human beings, however, are teleological, not just teleonomic, creatures: they have true purpose because they have conscious goals.
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Massimo:
What exploit it? It is really hard to avoid the language of intention!
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Yes, it is hard to avoid the language of intention. That’s one more reason for being very careful and minimize it.
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Yes, agreed.
One thing Pross seems to do is confuse teleonomic and teleologic. While I have little doubt that evolution produced/caused teleology, I have no idea how.
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Hi Massimo,
It was more the straightforward and clear writing that I was commending, not the being wrong. 🙂 I do think Harris is a good writer (despite often being wrong).
I was going by the Bourget/Chalmers survey, which has 56% opting for moral realism.
The best argument is that no moral-realist philosopher even knows what moral realism means. Really, they don’t! Ask them what “It is morally wrong to do X” is supposed to mean and they have no idea. It’s amazing the answers one gets! “It is morally wrong” means you shouldn’t do it, and you shouldn’t do it because it’s morally wrong, but other than going round that loop no moral-realist has any answer.
Moral subjectivism is also fairly obvious when morality is viewed from an evolutionary perspective (argument here).
Thus, now being long after both Hume and Darwin, I think we have reached the point where moral realism should be considered “obviously” wrong.
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Coel: Citing yourself on the obviousness of moral subjectivism is just fantastic. Especially when you have no credentials in philosophy and no one would pay you a penny to teach it.
Even those moral subjectivists in philosophy who publish in peer-reviewed venues don’t thing it is “obvious” and offer real arguments that involve the work of other professional philosophers.
Also, this dialogue is not about metaethics or moral realism. I mentioned it only because Massimo posted his old article, where he self-described as such.
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Hi Dan,
I’m glad to have amused you! But my argument was that moral subjectivism is pretty obvious from the scientific perspective (and thus my lack of credentials in philosophy is besides the point).
Human morals are an aspect of the natural world, and understanding the natural world is best done via science. If we were wanting to understand the human kidney or liver the biological/evolutionary perspective would be the appropriate tool; and if we are trying to understand human moral intuitions (and hence meta-ethics) then the evolutionary perspective is again the appropriate approach.
Yes, I realise that is heresy here. On this blog (and among philosophers) emotivism is a minority opinion, but it’s pretty mainstream among scientists (though they wouldn’t use the term, since they generally don’t know philosophers’ terminology; and sorry, no I don’t have a study to back that up, it’s only my impression; maybe someone should do such a study to complement Bourget/Chalmers?).
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Massimo and Dan–here’s a straightforward question: what necessary condition(s) would artificial intelligence entities need to fulfill to be considered teleologic?
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Peter Singer is not, as stated earlier, a moral realist. I think that he is somewhat confused on the issue, however we should grant him the position that he would claim for himself. What he does say is that he thinks that it makes no difference to moral arguments, whether one is coming from a realist or a non-realist position.
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Stars are born and die. This is referred to the “life cycle of a star” or “stellar evolution”. I suppose that one might see a competition for the limited resources of energy and matter. I only point this out in rebuttal to the glib dismissal of Gaia (which I do not mean to defend). Physicist Walter Thirring suggested that galaxies might be alive but on a time scale far t0o large for humans to comprehend (I’m not defending that either.)
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If we are to reject moral realism then the next step is to jettison the nonsensical concept of subjective morality.
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But I apologise, I am talking about moral realism and this is not the subject at hand. With the upcoming chapters of “Edge of Reason” we will have opportunity enough to cover the topic of moral realism.
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Coel,
Moral realism isn’t obviously wrong even from a scientific perspective, for the same reason that science doesn’t disprove mathematical Platonism, or any other metaphysical position. Yes, facts about the world, as we understand them, are relevant, but insufficient. One needs a philosophical argument.
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Alan,
Not sure your question is straightforward. But I would guess have purposive goals, consciously formulated.
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Robin,
And there I agree with Singer: it makes no difference, just like both the Platonism and the nominalistic do math in the same way despite their metaphysical differences.
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Bradley,
As a biologist I just don’t see in what sense stars may be alive, nor how they compete in a way that would trigger natural selection.
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In biology you could say that teeth have the properties they do because of their function of tearing and masticating food. I don’t think you could say the same thing about an atom or a galaxy etc.
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Just as a thought experiment; Given biological sentience, consider evolution as cycles of expansion and consolidation, from primitive bacteria, so modern societies.
What would it explain? Each level would start from the premises laid down by the previous and that from the prior. So this would start to explain why patterns develop and persist. Different organisms expand and compete, creating further limits along with the non-biological ones.
Expansion creates forms which prove insubstantial to further levels, so the consolidation stage is both destructive and empowering. These resulting layers create a step effect, as their resulting solidness resists further expansion and growth and the resulting pressures create forms which wouldn’t occur in more fluid contexts.
Just putting this up as a conversation piece, as I could offer up other ways it would explain, but thought others might consider ways it would or wouldn’t apply and it is well past my bedtime.
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